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Introduction
The issue of the ownership form of hospitals 
frequently crops up in political discussions in Slo-
vakia and surrounding countries. Health Minister 
Zajac`s 2004 reform (Pažitný [30]) was strongly 
based on the assumption that private ownership 
is the best solution. The Law on Health Care 
Providers, Medical Staff and Professional Orga-
nizations in the Health Service Sector (Nr. 578/
2004) decreed that all state providers should be 
transformed into private companies. The current 
Slovak government is trying to reverse this step, 
despite proposing a range of ownership forms in 
its programmatic statement. As it must respect 
the rule of law, its attempts are indirect, such 
as the decisions on the minimum network of 
providers, and promoting state-owned academic 
hospitals. 
In the Czech Republic the differentiation of 
political interests is even more visible. The So-
cial democrats have tried several times to stop 
any hospital privatisation. In 2005 they passed 
an amendment to the Law on Public Health (Nr. 
5/2005) to stop privatisation. The Council of 
Regions successfully appealed this amendment 
at the Constitutional Court, and the privatisation 
continued, supported by the then prime minister 
Topolanek`s government.
The New Public Management theories from the 
end of the last century advocated privatisation. 
But more recent governance and public-private-
-civil sector mix and cooperation approaches sug-
gest reasons for a range of ownership models 
(Pollit and Bouckaert, [31]). For example in the 
UK most hospitals are public, but in the Nether-
lands they are private. 
The goal of our paper is to examine the issue of 
the ownership of hospitals from both theoretical 
and practical Slovak perspectives. Our main re-
search questions are as follows:
1. How does economic theory deal with hospi-
tal ownership? 
2. What is the actual Slovak situation? Is there 
any evidence that would favour public or pri-
vate ownership?
The answers to these questions provide the ba-
sis for deciding whether the hospital ownership 
issue is an important reform question, or whether 
it is better described as a convenient ground for 
party political fights to attract voters - like the is-
sue of co-payments?
The basis for the theoretical analysis is modern 
neoclassical public economics represented for 
example by Samuelson [32], Stiglitz [43] and 
Musgrave [24], and by local authors Malý [22], 
Ochrana [26], [27], [28] and others. But we bri-
efly also note other points of view. The second 
part of the article is empirical, and examines 
the effects of different forms of hospital owner-
ship using available Slovak public source data. 
Standard qualitative and quantitative research 
methods are employed.
1. Current Neoclassical Economics 
and the Ownership in the Public 
Sector Issue
Ownership issues in the public sector have 
long been discussed. There are several distinct 
views: e.g. a middle ground neoclassical strand, 
a liberal view, and also left wing approaches. The 
core questions are the importance of ownership 
form, privatisation, and performance compari-
sons across organisations with different owner-
ship forms. 
Most “Anglo-Saxon” authors do not present pu-
blic ownership as the main feature of the public 
sector, but to compare performance across orga-
nisational forms define the public sector by func-
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tions (Stiglitz [43], Bailey [2], Cullis and Jones 
[6], Brown and Jackson [4], Apgar and Brown 
[1], Musgrave [24]). Also international statistics 
define a public sector activity as one with more 
than 50 % public financing, rather than by asset 
ownership.
The issue of the relations between the owner-
ship form of an organisation and its service de-
livery performance has been widely investigated 
(Cullis and Jones [5], Knapp and Missiakoulis 
[18], Kay and Thompson [16], Stiglitz [34], Dawer 
and Christensen [9], Weisbrod [43], Yarrow 
and Jasinski [42]). Their studies supply no sim-
ple answer. For example Cullis and Jones ([5], 
p. 169) argue that the level of competitiveness, 
not ownership, is the most important determinant 
of performance. 
Cullis and Jones ([5], [6]) are crucial for un-
derstanding privatisation theories in the public 
sector. According to them, privatisation can only 
be assessed by complex analyses that fully reflect 
all the conditions that determine the performance 
of public sector economic bodies. Changing pu-
blic monopolies into private ones will not in itself 
deliver improved outcomes. Privatisation is there-
fore not a goal in itself, but could be justified to 
improve performance. They advocate a wider de-
finition whereby any change in public sector deli-
very form, for example in ownership or financing, 
that raises efficiency and effectiveness, can be 
understood as privatisation. The most important 
implication of this is that any decision on chan-
ging public service delivery arrangements should 
be based on a careful case by case evaluation of 
concrete socio-economic conditions, and not on 
subjective ideas and preferences.
Cullis and Jones, and other authors such as 
Osborne and Gaebler [29], laid the base for the 
current approach of “middle stream” public eco-
nomics which employs concepts such as “public 
governance“ and “public-private-civil sector mix, 
partnerships, competition and cooperation”. 
We ourselves follow this approach. The basic 
concepts of such an approach are set out in 
Table 1, and derive from answers to the two core 
questions.
1. How do we produce public/collective servi-
ces?
2. How do we pay for them? 
 
As noted, there is no ubiquitously valid answer 
to these questions: only specific answers in parti-
cular conditions.
In addition the above authors make an impor-
tant distinction between the terms private hospi-
tal and privatisation of hospitals. Privatisation that 
just involves a change in ownership may simply 
involve a switch from public to private production 
of public goods, if they are delivered by a public 
service delivery arrangement. If such a change 
does not involve a switch to full private financing 
and deregulation, the service still remains public.
The issue of ownership is also dealt with by libe-
ral and “left wing” theories. But currently all such 
strands of thought have only marginal influence. 
For example the very limited popularity of propo-
sals to privatise via ownership change reflects the 
circumscribed success of the New Public Mana-
gement (NPM) approach. Current analyses (Pollit 
and Bouckaert [31], Lane [21], Coobes [7], Coo-
per [8]) clearly show some positive achievements 
for the approach. But the extensive achievements 
expected from New Public Management based 
changes were not fulfilled. Drechsler and Cattel 
[10, p. 95] go even further – their evaluation for 
our region is simply, “Adieu NPM“. 
In conclusion we need to stress the role of 
public choice theory, which may help explain why 
issues of only marginal influence may become so 
important to society.Public choice theories were 
presented by authors like Buchanan, Arrow and 
many others from the second half of the last cen-
tury. They represent important steps towards an 
economic explanation of the nature and failures 
of political processes. With some simplification 
we may summarise the main assumptions of public 
Tab. 1: Production and financing of public - collective services
Source: authors, drawing on Bailey [2] and on Cullis and Jones [5].
Resources
Public - collective services
Production
- private
- mixed
- public
- private
- pluralistic
- public
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choice theory as follows (see e.g. Mueller, 1979). 
All important expenditure decisions (including he-
alth care reform) are decided by collective voting, 
which is significantly imperfect. Politicians and 
bureaucrats are predominantly rent seekers, and 
protect their own, not the public interest. Their main 
strategies are re-election (politicians) or increased 
budget (bureaucrats). To be re-elected, politicians 
may make popular, but economically unnecessary 
(Pareto non-optimal) decisions to attract extra vo-
ters. In such a world political decisions can be enti-
rely different from domestically desired actions.
To sum up: theoretical considerations suggest 
that -
a/ The question of ownership of hospitals is not 
a core problem for current (neoclassical) public 
service delivery theories. 
b/ The main determinant of the performance of 
public organisations is the level of competitivene-
ss and not ownership. However, simultaneously 
the literature stresses that the level of compe-
tition in the hospital sector will always be very 
limited (Bjorkman [3]).
c/ Concrete decisions on ownership need to 
reflect specific conditions. Changes are appropri-
ate only in situations where benefits from change 
clearly overweight the costs of such change. 
d/ Public choice theory helps to explain why 
some “marginal” economic questions may beco-
me issues of top political importance. 
2. Ownership Forms of Hospitals in 
Slovakia and the Analysis of Main 
Aspects of Their Performance
In this second part of our article we try to 
answer the question of the optimum ownership 
form of Slovak hospitals using actual performan-
ce data. But from the start, be aware that there is 
little available relevant data. 
2.1 Current Situation
The 2004 health care reform and subsequent 
actions created a really interesting hospital 
ownership structure (Table 2).
In 2007 there were 89 public hospitals and 
83 “other” hospitals. State hospitals are those 
where the “owner – establishing body” is a state 
body, whereas public hospitals are these, where 
the “owner – establishing body” is a regional or 
local self-government. The other possible forms 
are private company or non-profit organisation. 
However, all hospitals in Slovakia, including pri-
vate companies, are predominantly financed from 
public insurance. This means (see above text) 
that there are no hospitals that are both privately 
owned and funded. So our analysis will only use 
the terms public hospitals, including state and 
self-government hospitals (87) and non-state 
hospitals (83). 
Tab. 2: Incidence of hospitals by ownership and region (2007)
Source: Ministry of Health
Explanations: TT – Trnava, TN – Trencin, NR – Nitra, BB – Banska Bystrica, ZA – Zilina, PO – Presov, KE – Kosice 
regions
Ownership
Western Slovakia
Central
Slovakia
Eastern 
Slovakia Brati-
-slava
Total
TT TN NR BB ZA PO KE
State – Ministry of
Health establishments
4 3 6 13 6 8 11 10 61
State – other state bo-
dies` establishments
0 1 0 0 1 2 0 2 6
Public – regional or 
local self-governments
4 4 2 2 5 3 1 1 22
“Other” (profit and 
non-profit companies)
4 8 6 14 5 21 11 14 83
Total 12 16 14 29 17 34 23 27 172
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2.2 Measuring Hospital Perfor-
mance 
Health economics and health practice provides 
no perfect measure of health providers` perfor-
mance (Figueras, Robinson, Jakubovski [12]). 
Here we employ the World Health Organisati-
on`s methodology (WHO [43]), which evaluates 
health systems on the basis of fairness, effective-
ness and health status (medical quality). Because 
of space and data limitations the main part of our 
later analysis focuses on effectiveness.
Important trade-offs between these three dimen-
sions are shown in Figure 1. Given limited resou-
rces the trade-offs imply that almost any macro-le-
vel health sector decision represents some kind of 
a compromise between competing goals. 
Efficiency – Economic Performance of Hos-
pitals
It might be thought that because all Slovak hos-
pitals are predominantly publically financed, as-
sessing economic performance using public data 
will be a simple task. This is far from the case. So 
we had to use fragmented data published in the 
media and to undertake our own field research. 
This required us to narrow our focus to a compa-
rison of productivity and financial results (debts). 
Our research sample is relatively small and selec-
ted from hospitals that were willing to co-operate. 
Because the number of hospitals in the different 
ownership forms is too small, standard statistical 
testing of sample validity is impossible. Hence 
all data have an illustrative and not a statistically 
representative character. 
Productivity of labour in public and non-state 
Slovak hospitals 
Using data directly obtained from hospitals 
willing to co-operate (from a planned random 
sample) we show labour productivity from the be-
ginning of privatisation in 2005 to 2007. Labour 
productivity is measured as the ratio of total reve-
nues from health service delivery (reimbursement 
plus direct payments) to number of employees. 
The anonymous, sometimes incomplete results 
for eight hospitals are summarised in Tables 3 
and 4.
The results do not provide clear picture. Higher 
productivity is achieved by public hospitals, possi-
bly from scale economies and better initial positi-
ons; but average productivity growth is greater for 
non-state hospitals (Table 5). 
It is clear that we are unable to provide any 
definitive answers, not least because our sample 
is too small. However the productivity data gives 
little impression that it is determined more by 
ownership form rather than by the hospital mana-
gements` approaches. 
From the point of view of management, non-
-state hospitals are in better situation, as they 
have more freedom (see also next section) to 
determine their cost and revenue structure – to 
influence the so-called “case-mix”. In the conditi-
ons, where payments from insurance companies 
are not based on real economic figures, but only 
on rough estimates (see for example Maly [22] 
or Pazitny et al. [31]) some treatments are more 
“productive”, some less effective. Small non-state 
health establishments with flexible and effective 
Fig. 1: “Magic triangle” of health care
Source: authors` construction
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management systems have the opportunity to 
react to these deficiencies and to select a profi-
table profile for their activities; large regional or 
teaching hospitals must treat the rest, regardless 
of the impact on their economic performance.
Hospital financial performance (debts)
We assess financial performance by its crucial 
dimension – debts. The Ministry denied us com-
prehensive data, so we show only partial media-
-provided statistics (Table 6). 
Ministry of Health data clearly show the critical 
situation of state hospitals. At the end of 2007 
this group owed creditors 5,842 bil. Sk (about 
5 % of total health care expenditures in Slovakia in 
2007), and their financial situation is continuing 
to deteriorate. The largest creditors are drug sup-
pliers – 55.4 %. Other creditors include gas, ener-
gy and water suppliers – 8.4  %; works suppliers 
5.9  %; and other suppliers 11.5 %. State hospitals 
also owe money to other hospitals and to insuran-
ce companies. They are also late in paying their 
Tab. 3: Labour productivity in public hospitals (H) 2005-2007
 
H1 H2 H3 H4
2005 2006 2007 2005 2006 2007 2005 2006 2007 2005 2006 2007
Revenues 
[Sk]
127524 141785 174130 2720335 2736890 X 1084383 961038 X 689950 707179 X
PPEPP 
[persons]
224,2 228,1 241,3 4262,3 4260,1 X 1913,2 1874,1 X 1465,1 1450,2 X
PP [Sk/
person]
569,3 621,86 722,53 638,28 642,46 X 566,85 512,83 X 470,96 487,71 X
 H5 H6 H7 H8
2005 2006 2007 2005 2006 2007 2005 2006 2007 2005 2006 2007
Revenues 
[Sk]
815352 885586 1079808 611835 648981 X 393051 427606 596867 430012 451774 X
PPEPP 
[persons]
1619,1 1608,2 1595,2 1324,3 1330,1 X 1329,1 1308,2 1287,3 1189,1 1170,1 X
PP [Sk/
person]
503,61 550,74 677,00 462,11 487,96 X 295,75 326,91 463,77 361,66 386,13 X
Source: Authors` research 
Explanations: PP: productivity of labour 
PPEPP: average weighted number of employees
SN1 SN2 SN3 SN4 SN5
2005 2006 2007 2005 2006 2007 2005 2006 2007 2005 2006 2007 2005 2006 2007
Revenues 
[Sk]
63902 72891 83029 63751 60000 X 54456 58716 64367 492138 524068 615095 136025 272043 X
PPEPP 
[persons]
223,3 180,3 181,1 158,2 158,3 X 179,3 166,1 152,2 912,3 918,2 926,2 664,3 692,1 X
PP [Sk/
person]
286,56 405 461,27 403,48 379,74 X 304,2 353,71 423,47 539,63 570,88 664,25 204,86 393,13 X
Tab. 4: Labour productivity in non-state hospitals (SN) 2005-2007
Source: Authors` research 
Explanations: PP: productivity of labour 
PPEPP: average weighted number of employees
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social contributions – their unpaid commitments 
to the public monopoly responsible for the pen-
sion system – the Social Insurance Company 
- represented 15  % of their total debt (MZ SR 
[44]). Published data also exclude so-called “old 
debts”: debts transferred under the previous go-
vernment from hospitals to the Veriteľ (Veritel was 
the Dzurinda government`s purpose-made public 
company responsible for managing then existing 
hospital debts). For example in December 2006 
such debts were put at 468.5 million Sk. 
Self-government hospitals are also in debt, but 
their trend, which shows a small nominal decrea-
se, is much more positive. The best situation is in 
the non-state hospitals sector, which has balan-
ced financial results. 
Tab. 5: Indices of labour productivity and labour costs 2005, 2006 and 2007
Productivity Labour costs
06/05 07/06 07/05 06/05 07/06 07/05
H1 1,09 1,16 1,27 1,19 1,28 1,52
H2 1,01 x x 1,03 x x
H3 0,90 x x 1,12 x x
H4 1,04 x x 1,08 x x
H5 1,09 1,23 1,34 1,12 1,19 1,32
H6 1,06 x x 1,14 x x
H7 1,26 1,42 1,57 1,14 1,30 1,47
H8 1,07 x x 1,14 x x
SN1 1,41 1,14 1,61 0,90 1,13 1,02
SN2 0,94 x x 0,90 x x
SN3 1,16 1,20 1,39 1,04 1,11 1,15
SN4 1,06 1,16 1,23 1,08 1,16 1,25
SN5 1,92 x x 1,90 x x
Source: Authors` research 
Tab. 6: Cumulated external debt of hospitals (unpaid commitments) from 1.1.2005, mil. Sk)
 31.12.2005  30.6.2006  31.12. 2006  30.6. 2007  31.12.2007
 State hospitals 2 033 2 887 4 435 5 155 5 842
Hospitals transformed 
into companies
x 15 14 21 6
Hospitals “owned”
by self-governments 
2 384* 2 342* 2 275* 2 094* 1 960
Non-profit hospitals x x x x 194
Deficit total 5 634 5 523 6 821 7 292 8 074
Source: Správa o vývoji dlhov v rezorte zdravotníctva k 31. 12. 2007
* including non-profit hospitals
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Debt data has been misused by some “experts” 
to promote privatisation. But we feel that the 
reason for the variations is not the ownership 
type, but the form of budgetary constraints (cap). 
State hospitals have so-called “soft budgetary 
constraints”, incentivising them to create debts, 
as indicated in Figure 2. 
A system of “soft budgetary constraints“ can 
also be attractive to the state. It allows it to ask 
directly managed hospitals to deliver health servi-
ces independent of finance. Most commentators 
think that the level of reimbursements for most 
diagnoses is below the existing treatment costs. 
An example was the situation in Banska Bystrica 
academic hospital in 2008. The hospital director 
introduced a “crisis regime” to cap debts. But 
the Minister of Health immediately asked him to 
cancel all his new internal regulations limiting the 
level of “free” patient services. 
Further evidence for such policies is the fact 
that the size and type of hospital significantly 
correlate with their financial performance. Every 
large academic hospital delivering universal 
and specialised services is indebted - Fakultná 
nemocnica s poliklinikou Bratislava, Fakultná ne-
mocnica s poliklinikou Banská Bystrica, Fakultná 
nemocnica s poliklinikou Košice, Fakultná nemoc-
nica s poliklinikou Prešov, Fakultná nemocnica 
Trnava. But small and specialised state hospitals 
are in good financial health - Fakultná nemocnica 
s poliklinikou Nové Zámky, Národný onkologický 
ústav Bratislava, Národné rehabilitačné centrum 
Kováčová, Inštitút nukleárnej a molekulárnej me-
dicíny Košice, Detská fakultná nemocnica s poli-
klinikou Banská Bystrica. 
2.3 Quality of Health Services 
It is relatively difficult to measure the quality of 
hospital services. And unfortunately there is no 
systematic public data available on it. Here we 
will try to estimate the clinical and organisational 
quality of delivery of hospital services (Kuvíková, 
Murgaš, Nemec [20]) using selected implicit 
indicators: the structure of complaints submit-
ted to the Health Care Surveillance Authority 
(www.udzs.sk) and quality rankings. 
Patients´ complaints
Our original idea was a comprehensive evalua-
tion of the purposes of complaints and of addres-
sees of complaints submitted to the Health Care 
Surveillance Authority. We did not anticipate 
a problem because the full list of complaints 
and the Authority’s opinions on them was origi-
nally publicly available. However, this practice 
has been discontinued and we had to ask the 
Authority for data. The response from the office 
responsible for regulating of the health system 
and its quality was a refusal to provide any com-
Fig. 2: “Soft budgetary constraints”
Source: authors` construction
Tab. 7: Complaints received by the Health Care Surveillance Authority 2006 – 2008
Complaints received
Authority decision Number of com-
plaints against aca-
demic hospitalsValid Invalid
2008 1431 148 613 901
2007 1226 146 530 720
2006 1263 209 535 664
Source: Health Care Surveillance Authority, 2009 
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parative data. It claimed such data was not held 
in a form that allowed a comparative analysis (this 
situation suggests that the Office as the public 
(transparent) regulator is failing in its duty, and 
has fallen under political influence). We received 
only a limited sample of partial data (Table 7).
The data in the Table 7 indicate that a majo-
rity of complaints relate to the quality of care 
in academic hospitals. They also show that the 
Authority is not able to provide timely decisions. 
As academic hospitals provide about 40  % of all 
treatments and deal with the more complicated 
cases, where complaints are more likely, we feel 
the data does not clearly indicate quality variati-
ons by type of hospital. 
Quality rankings 
According to the current legislation (Law 581/
2004 as amended), quality rankings of health es-
tablishments are compulsory, and health insuran-
ce companies are required to construct them as 
a basis for contract negotiations with providers. 
Under such regulation it may seem obvious that 
ranking systems provide effective quality bench-
marks. But again we found a different reality.
Health insurance companies respect the law 
and construct rankings, but their attempts are un-
coordinated and their criteria differ. Table 8 pro-
vides examples of such rankings. The first is from 
2007 for the company Dôvera. Its main criteria 
are the general level of health service quality; the 
complexity of services and departments; person-
nel; equipment and the position of the hospital in 
its region. This approach focuses on capacities 
and availability of services; real clinical quality is 
not effectively incorporated. The second 2007 
ranking is by the largest provider – the General 
Health Insurance Company. It was constructed 
using indicators on the management of chronic 
diabetes; the management of chronic pneumo-
nia; non-planned readmissions of patients after 
day surgery; and patients` satisfaction surveys. 
The final ranking was constructed in 2008 by 
a consortium of insurance companies - Apollo, 
Dôvera and Union. It was based on patients´ sa-
tisfaction surveys, with twelve questions focusing 
on satisfaction with medical staff approaches and 
behaviour, satisfaction with care and its results, 
and satisfaction with support services (catering, 
accommodation and cleaning). 
Table 8 shows that different quality indicators 
tell different stories. If service complexity is the 
main issue, academic hospitals are superior, but 
patients feel better in smaller, non state hospitals. 
The negative message for our inquiry is that the-
se existing quality rankings cannot be used to 
produce a comprehensive comparative analysis 
of performance.
Tab. 8: Selected quality rankings
Order Dôvera VšZP Apollo, Dôvera and Union
1. FNsP Bratislava Ľubovnianska nemocnica, n. o. FNsP Milosrdní, s. r. o. Bratislava
2. FN J.A. Reimana Prešov Nemocnica Zdravie, s. r. o. Púchov Nemocnica, a. s. Šaca – Košice
3. FN L. Pasteura Košice Nemocnica, s. r. o. Krompachy Nemocnica Zdravie, s. r. o. Púchov
4. NsP Žilina NsP Dolný Kubín Ľubovnianska nemocnica, n. o.
5. FNsP Nové Zámky Nemocnica Stropkov Nemocnica, s. r. o. Bánovce
6. FN Nitra Nemocnica, s. r. o. Handlová Nemocnica, n.o. Kežmarok
7. MFN Martin VšNsP. A. s. Levoča Nemocničná a. s. Malacky
8. FNsP F. D. Rooswelta BB Nemocnica, n.o. Kežmarok Nemocnica, s. r. o. Handlová
9. FN Trnava Nemocnica, a. s. Šaca - Košice NsP Hnúšťa
10. FN Trenčín NsP Ilava NsP Snina
Source: own compilation from web pages of selected health insurance companies
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2.4 Access to Health Care /
fairness 
The argument that privatisation decreases 
universal access is, together with the argument 
that private hospitals channel public health care 
resources into private pockets, one of the most 
frequents objections to private hospital owner-
ship. However, our independent economic 
analysis suggests the problem is absent from 
Slovakia. 
We have noted that Slovakia introduced a uni-
versal social health insurance system, guarante-
eing all citizens have non means tested access 
to a basic package of health services. Almost 
all hospital treatments are financed by a health 
insurance system that covers all citizens. In such 
a system access is unrelated to the hospitals` 
ownership forms. If the treatment is approved by 
an insurance company, it will be provided. 
Discussions about access in relation to owner-
ship are in reality discussions about the priorities 
of the respective government. Different govern-
ments may opt for different priorities from three 
main dimensions of the “Magic Triangle” (Figure 
1). For example:
a/ Governments focusing on access should 
prefer state owned and controlled hospitals. Only 
in such environments can they ask or order hos-
pitals to provide more services than are actually 
reimbursed. Access is guaranteed but efficiency 
is sacrificed (debts increase). 
b/ Governments focusing on efficiency should 
prefer non-state hospitals. These hospitals are 
at least semi-independent and must operate 
in more transparent financial environment with 
hard budgetary constraints. Rational non-state 
hospitals will deliver all ordered and reimbursed 
services, but may refuse any additional financi-
ally unsound demands. Thus efficiency may be 
secured, but access is limited by lack of available 
public insurance resources. 
In any case, we can show that access to 
hospital services in Slovakia is unrelated to the 
ownership form of hospitals, and so discussions 
on assess are based on political and not econo-
mic grounds.
Conclusions
Our limited data indicate that there is no 
conclusive evidence on which hospital ownership 
form would suit Slovak conditions. We were not 
able to find any causal link between the owner-
ship form and hospital performance. Observable 
differences can be explained by more obviously 
relevant factors. 
Indeed the question is predominantly political. 
We need to recognise that public sector econo-
mics encompasses many questions that have no 
definitive answers. But some politicians and eco-
nomists that want a different answer for ideologi-
cal reasons will disagree. And given this fact it is 
clear we need to discuss ownership questions to 
prevent important implementation failures.
What are main results from our study? First, we 
provide important theoretical arguments that the 
ownership form of hospitals is not the main de-
terminant of their performance. We also propose 
that decisions about hospital privatisation should 
take account of the concrete environment of the 
policy. In general the public-private-civil sector 
mix seems to be the most appropriate policy re-
sponse to the issue. 
The fact that our search for practical compari-
sons almost failed is also very important. It indi-
cates that the current priority is non-transparency, 
which creates space for economic and political 
manipulations. In spite of lack of data, we feel 
that quality, accessibility and efficiency of hospi-
tal care in Slovakia does not depend ownership 
forms. 
Why then is the issue of ownership so fre-
quently discussed? Public choice theory com-
prehensively explains why this topic is really 
politically important. If, as in the Slovak case, 
voters are not well informed, then different politi-
cal actors and interest groups can use the issue 
of hospital ownership to label themselves in the 
socio-political space, and consequently to attract 
more voters. This is not surprise: for example Sti-
glitz [34] (p. 188 and 299) provides well known 
economic/public choice explanations:
- Politicians decide on the base of own inte-
rest.
Their main strategy is re-election. 
- In democracy decisions on public expenditu-
res are compromise between interests of diffe-
rent groups and such decisions normally do not 
respect outcomes from economic analysis.
Because the issue of the ownership of hospi-
tals is dominantly political one, practical answers 
of concrete governments to it would be based on 
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political priorities. In conditions of limited resour-
ces trade offs between three basic choices (qua-
lity, access and efficiency) are necessary. Social 
government are expected to prefer to sacrifice 
efficiency and to achieve this they need to create 
centrally managed non-transparent hospital sys-
tem. Liberal governments are expected to prefer 
efficiency and sacrifice universality of access, or 
at least fairness – as the “best” alternative, rich 
will receive better services, but access for poor 
still may remain guaranteed. 
This work was supported by the Slovak 
Research and Development Agency under 
the contract No. APVV-0267-07. The project 
focuses on the aim to map current status in the 
area of selected forms of privatization public 
services in Slovakia in detail, define impacts of 
existing problems and suggest ways and metho-
dology of solution.
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ABSTRACT
THE OWNERSHIP FORM OF HOSPITALS FROM THE VIEWPOINTS OF ECONOMIC THE-
ORY AND SLOVAK PRACTICE
Juraj Nemec, Beáta Meričková, Jana Štrangfeldová
The marketization of public services, among them health care service aims at a continuous incre-
ase in public expenditure efficiency, continual improvements in public services quality, the imple-
mentation of the professional management tools in the public sector and developing the plurality 
system of ownership forms in public service delivering – privatization in public services. 
Redefinition of the roles of the state and private providers, privatization in health care became 
a central theme of recent health care reforms in Slovakia. The debate about the pros and cons of 
privatization in health care is very intensive, though mainly at the political level. Some opponents 
still regard privatization as a policy simply advocated to cut back the role of the public sector in 
health care. But advocates of privatization believe it can raise effectiveness and quality. 
Our article analyses the problem of Slovak hospital ownership. It begins with a brief theoretical 
overview of the key aspects of privatisation: predominantly from the viewpoint of neoclassical pu-
blic economics.
The analytical part was intended provide a comparative analysis of performance of different 
types of Slovak hospitals. But the lack of publicly available data limits the scope and depth of our 
analysis.
Despite these limitations our article argues that ownership form is not the main determinant of 
hospital performance. We base this argument on both theoretical grounds and on our empirical 
evidence from Slovakia. In the light of this argument, we propose that decisions about hospital 
privatisation and its form, in spite of their dominantly political character, should respect concrete 
conditions and the specific environment. A public-private-civil sector ownership mix seems to be 
the most appropriate current response for Slovakia.
This work was supported by the Slovak Research and Development Agency under the contract 
No. APVV-0267-07.
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